obstacle to their flourishing. And if that judgment is not objectively true, then Nietzsche"s critique of MPS simply has no force.
Of course, Nietzsche also makes affirmative claims that suggest he thinks judgments of prudential value, judgments about what is good and bad for a person are objective. He holds, for example, that "herd" morality is good for the herd, but that it is bad for higher men, noting, e.g., that "The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd--but not reach out beyond it" (WP 287; emphasis added). Elsewhere he describes slave morality as simply "the prudence [Klugheit] of the lowest order" (GM I:13). 4 When it comes to value judgments pertaining to welfare or prudential goodness--what is good or bad for particular sorts of persons--Nietzsche seems to believe (and, for his critique to have bite, needs to believe) that there is an objective fact of the matter.
Commitment to the objectivity of prudential value is not, however, an ambitious position. Railton dubs it "relationalism" (1986a) and suggests that we "think of [non- Klugheit is standardly rendered in translations of Nietzsche as "cleverness," though with a decidedly pejorative connotation, Klugheit being, according to 19 th -century anti-semites, a typical trait of Jews. Nietzsche, in the Genealogy, clearly exploits this connotation, associating it with the scheming and calculating nature of the "slaves." Of course, Nietzsche turns the anti-semitic trope on its head, by arguing that it is precisely the Klugheit of the slaves and the Jews that is responsible for Christianity! But the Klugheit at issue in the Genealogy is quite clearly a kind of calculating prudence, i.e., setting up a scheme of valuation that is actually in the interests of the slaves.
Nietzsche is, indeed, a "perfect" moral skeptic, or so I shall argue, since he holds that moral value (valuations of what is good or bad simpliciter or non-relationally) is not objective. So, for example, while the judgment MPS is bad for higher human beings is objectively true, the judgment that MPS is disvaluable simpliciter or should be defeated because it is bad for higher human beings is not.
What is involved for Nietzsche in denying the "objectivity" of what is morally right and wrong, morally good and bad? I have been purposely vague so far about whether the issues are semantic, metaphysical, and/or epistemological; indeed, as I have argued elsewhere (Leiter 2000) , Nietzsche has no discernible semantic view at all. Here we will concentrate on the metaphysical and epistemological issues. On the reading I will defend, Nietzsche is a moral skeptic in the sense of affirming the metaphysical thesis that there do not exist any objective moral properties or facts (I will refer to this hereafter as simply "skepticism about moral facts"). From this it will, of course, follow that there is also no moral knowledge, but it is the argument for the metaphysical thesis that is crucial for Nietzsche. Now it seems obvious that some of Nietzsche"s skepticism about moral facts is simply skepticism about a kind of Platonism about value. Plato, to be sure, does not think there is a special problem about the objectivity of value, since he thinks values are objective in the same way all Forms are. 5 A Form, says Plato, "is eternal, and neither comes into being nor perishes, neither waxes nor wanes" (Symposium 211a). In the Phaedo, he calls them "constant and invariable" (78d) while in The Republic he refers to them as "the very things themselves…ever remaining the same and unchanged" (479e).
Forms are, in the words of The Symposium, "pure, clear, unmixed-not infected with human flesh and color, and a lot of other mortal nonsense" (211a).
5 I here confine attention to the theory of forms of the middle books. Similarly, writing in his own voice in The Gay Science, Nietzsche observes that, "Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature-nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, as a present-and it was we who gave and bestowed it" (GS 301). Of course, many realists about value might be happy to acknowledge that "without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow"; as Railton, for example, puts it, "In a universe without subjectivity [i.e., without creatures for whom things matter], there is no value either" (1986a: 18).
Yet Nietzsche goes further than this when he suggests that it is we who give things their value, though even on this score there are arguably some "realist" views, such as the sensibility theories of McDowell and Wiggins, compatible with this projectivist rhetoric.
In any case, if Nietzsche"s only target were the metaphysics of Platonism about value, Nietzsche"s skepticism might not worry a lot of contemporary philosophers-though it is perhaps worth emphasizing that a kind of Platonism about value remains central to most cultural and religious traditions, so his skepticism on this score is hardly trivial.
Of course, genuine skepticism about Platonism about value-since it is just skepticism about the objectivity of Forms generally-would entail a kind of skepticism about the objectivity of prudential value that, I have already suggested, is no part of Nietzsche"s view. This suggests that the rhetoric of some of the Nietzschean passages just quoted can not actually suffice for understanding Nietzsche"s skepticism about the objectivity of morality.
In a range of other passages, Nietzsche emphasizes that moral judgment involves a kind of projective error, and here it is especially important to note that the emphasis is not on value simpliciter, but on moral value. So, for example, in Daybreak, he notes that just as we now recognize that it was "an enormous error" "when man gave all things a sex" but still believed "not that he was playing, but that he had gained a profound insight," so, too, man "has ascribed to all that exists a connection with morality [Moral] and laid an ethical significance [ethische Bedeutung] on the world"s back," which will "one day" be viewed as meaningful as talk about "the masculinity or feminity of the sun" Just as the astrologist thinks that there are astrological facts (about man"s future)
supervening on the astronomical facts about the stars-when, in fact, there are only the stars themselves, obeying their laws of motion--so too the "moral man" thinks his moral experiences are responsive to moral properties that are part of the essence of things, when, like the astrological facts, they are simply causal products of something else, namely our feelings. As Nietzsche puts it, moral judgments are "images" and "fantasies,"
the mere effects of psychological and physiological attributes of the people making those judgments, attributes of which they are largely unaware (D 119).
As I argued in my book (Leiter 2002: 148-149) , these kinds of remarks suggest a "best explanation" argument for anti-realism about moral value: the best explanation for our moral experiences is not that they pick out objective moral features of phenomena, but rather that they are caused by facts about our psychological make This persistent disagreement on foundational questions, of course, distinguishes moral theory from inquiry in the sciences and mathematics, not, perhaps, in kind, but certainly in degree. In the hard sciences and mathematics, intellectual discourse regularly transcends cultural and geographic boundaries and consensus emerges about at least some central propositions. How to explain the failure of moral theory to achieve anything like this? That is the question, to which Nietzsche proposes a skeptical answer-or so I shall argue. But first let us make explicit the structure of this skeptical argument before returning to Nietzsche"s texts.
II. Arguments for Moral Skepticism from Disagreement
Standard "best explanation" arguments for moral skepticism focus on the fact of moral judgment, and claim that the best explanation of such judgments is not the objective moral features of the situation to which the moral agent putatively responds, but rather psychological and sociological factors that cause the agent to give expression to the particular moral judgment. In the version of this argument I have defended (Leiter 2001) , the central problem with explanations of our moral judgments that appeal to the existence of objective moral facts is that they fail to satisfy demands of consilience and simplicity that we expect from successful explanatory theories. Moral explanations fail along the dimension of consilience because they posit facts-"moral" facts-that are too neatly tailored to their explanans (they are, as I shall say, explanatorily "narrow"), and that don"t effect the kind of unification of disparate phenomena we look for in successful explanations. They fail along the dimension of simplicity because they complicate our ontology without any corresponding gain in explanatory power or scope. 7 The latter claim is, of course, crucial to the anti-realist argument. For if it were true that without moral facts we would suffer some kind of explanatory loss, then moral explanations (and moral realism) would be in the same metaphysical boat as the postulates of any of the special sciences: physics can"t, after all, do the explanatory work of biology, which is why, by "best explanation" criteria, we can admit biological facts into our ontology. 8 7 Some moral realists claim that moral properties are just identical with or supervenient upon the non-moral natural properties that figure in the alternative explanations of moral judgments. But a claim of identity or supervenience can not--in isolation--save moral realism against the explanatory argument, for we must earn our right to such claims by both (a) vindicating the identity/supervenience thesis on nonexplanatory grounds; and (b) vindicating the added theoretical complexity involved in these theses by demonstrating that they produce a gain in consilience or some cognate epistemic virtue (e.g., explanatory unification). I have argued (Leiter 2001 ) that they do not. 8 More precisely, non-reductive moral realists want to defend moral explanations in a way akin to Jerry Fodor's defense of the autonomy of the special sciences: they want to claim that there are distinctive "groupings" and generalizations in moral explanations that can not be captured by a more "basic" explanatory scheme or science. Just as nothing in physics captures the distinctive categories and generalizations of economics and psychology, so too biology and psychology are supposed to miss the distinctive generalizations of moral theory.
Needless to say, no a priori considerations can demonstrate that there will never be an explanatory loss from eliminating moral facts from our best account of the world.
Two sorts of considerations, however, may make us skeptical of the realist's claim. First, if we go outside the contemporary philosophical debate and look to scholars in other disciplines actually concerned with explanatory questions, we will not find anyone trying to do serious explanatory work with moral facts. Outside of informal ways of speaking and "folk explanations," moral facts appear to play no role in explanatory theories, certainly in no developed explanations of interesting historical phenomena. Philosophers would perhaps do well not to forget that while, for example, there are Marxist historians using broadly "economic" facts to explain historical events, there is no school of "Moral Now the skeptical argument that concerns us will differ along three key dimensions from the more familiar kinds of "best explanation" arguments for moral skepticism just noted. First, what is at issue is not what we might call "raw" moral judgments, as in Harman"s famous flaming pussycat case, where someone witnesses young hoodlums dousing a cat and setting it on fire and reacts by judging the act morally wrong or reprehensible. Instead, our data points consist of philosophical theories about morality that purport to license particular judgments by answering foundational questions. A philosophical theory, for purposes here, is a discursive and systematic account of correct moral judgment and action based on reasons and evidence that purports to be acceptable to rational agents. Second, the explanatory question concerns not any particular philosophical theory, but rather the fact that there exist incompatible philosophical theories purporting to answer foundational questions. And they are not just incompatible philosophical theories: the disagreements of moral philosophers are amazingly intractable. Nowhere do we find lifelong Kantians suddenly (or even gradually) converting to Benthamite utilitarianism, or vice versa. So the "best explanation" argument asks: what is the best explanation for the fact that philosophical theories, in the sense just noted, reach different and quite intractable conclusions about foundational questions? Nietzsche"s skeptical answer will be that the best explanation is the absence of any objective fact of the matter about foundational moral questions conjoined with (according to Nietzsche) the psychological needs of philosophers which lead them to find compelling dialectical justifications for very different basic moral propositions. We"ll return to Nietzsche"s views on this score shortly. Third, consilience and simplicity are again theoretical desiderata to be weighed in comparing explanations, but their interaction with moral realism is different: the claim at issue will be that skepticism about morality is part of a more consilient and simpler explanation for the existence of incompatible philosophical theories of morality than is the assumption that there are objective facts about fundamental moral propositions, but that competing philosophical theories of morality fail to converge upon them.
In short, what makes Nietzsche"s argument from moral disagreement especially interesting is that, unlike most familiar varieties, it does not purport to exploit anthropological reports about the moral views of exotic cultures, or even garden-variety conflicting moral intuitions about concrete cases (such as abortion or the death penalty).
Instead, Nietzsche locates disagreement at the heart of the most sophisticated moral philosophies of the West, among philosophers who very often share lots of beliefs and practices and who, especially, in the last century, often share the same judgments about concrete cases. Yet what we find is that these philosophers remain locked in apparently intractable disagreement about the most important, foundational issues about morality. 9 9 It may be useful to distinguish the argument at issue here from some related skeptical-sounding arguments based on the phenomenon of disagreement. One is "the so-called pessimistic induction on the history of science," as Philip Kitcher calls it (1993: 136) or the skeptical meta-induction as Putnam earlier dubbed the same phenomenon. Here is Kitcher"s statement of the skeptical position:
Here one surveys the discarded theories of the past; points out that these were once accepted on the basis of the same kind of evidence that we now employ to support our own accepted theories, notes that those theories are, nevertheless, now regarded as false; and concludes that our own accepted theories are very probably false. (1993: 136) Now this basic argumentative strategy might, indeed, seem to have some force against theories of morality. After all--so the argument would go--many earlier claims about morality were based on the same kinds of evidence about what is "intuitively obvious" that underlie contemporary Kantian and utilitarian theories. Yet we now regard intuitions about, for example, the obvious moral inferiority of certain classes of people as social or cultural or economic artifacts, not data on which we might base a moral theory. Is it not possible-especially with the often surprising results about diversity of intuitions being adduced by experimental philosophers?-that the intuitions undergirding our current moral theories will also turn out to seem equally unreliable, and so our moral theories false?
This strategy of skeptical argument is easily rebutted, however. To start, many of the racist and sexist claims of earlier moral theories were based not on intuitions, but on putatively empirical claims Aristotle"s views about "natural" slaves, for whom slavery was supposed to be in their non-moral interest, or Kant"s disparaging remarks about Africans depended on armchair psychological and sociological hypotheses that are not factually accurate. Indeed, the kind of response to the skeptical induction that Kitcher develops on behalf of the scientific realist would seem to help the moral realist as well. For Kitcher says that, in fact, "more and more of the posits of theoretical science endure within contemporary science" (1993: 136), and, indeed, that our earlier mistakes (which we now recognize as such) fall into a recognizable pattern, so that we can see where and why we are likely to have gone wrong in the past, and thus be more confident that we are not replicating those mistakes in our current theories.
So, too, the moral realist might claim that the mistakes made by earlier moral theorists also fall into a discernible pattern, typically consisting in failing to include within the moral community-the community of persons with moral standing-people who belonged there because of false assumptions about those persons that admit of straightforward historical, sociological and economic explanations. Thus, on this story, what we learn from the history of failures in past moral theories is precisely that we should be especially skeptical about excluding some persons (or, not to prejudge the issue, some sentient creatures!) from the category of beings with moral standing. Of course, as everyone knows, the criteria of moral standing remain hotly contested, a fact to be exploited by the skeptical argument I will attribute to Nietzsche. Now in the context of scientific realism, Kitcher wants to draw a stronger conclusion against the skeptic, namely, that we are actually entitled to a kind of "optimistic induction" from the fact that since every successor theory "appears closer to the truth than" the theory it displaced "from the perspective of our current theory," to the conclusion that "our theories will appear to our successors to be closer to the truth than our predecessors" (1993: 137). But the moral theorist can not avail himself of a similar "optimistic induction," and for a reason that will be important to the skeptical argument here: namely, that it is not the case that, for example, later deontological theories view earlier utilitarian theories as getting closer to the moral truth than their utilitarian ancestors, and vice versa.
More recently, there has been a lively debate among philosophers about the epistemological implications of disagreement among what are usually called "epistemic peers." What is standardly at issue in this literature is whether or not the fact of such disagreement should lead us to adjust the degree of credence an agent assigns to his own beliefs (see, e.g., Christensen [2007] and Kelly [2005] for contrasting views). By contrast, the skeptical argument at issue here aims for a metaphysical conclusion via an Let us now look at the evidence that Nietzsche advances this argument, before considering some of the possible objections to it.
III. Nietzsche's Version of the Skeptical Argument
There are a set of remarks about moral philosophy and moral philosophers in Nietzsche about which scholars rarely comment, but which bear directly on the argument for moral skepticism at issue here. This passage is representative:
It is a very remarkable moment: the Sophists verge upon the first critique of morality [Moral] , the first insight into morality:--they juxtapose the multiplicity abductive inference: namely, that the fact of disagreement about X is best explained by there not being any objective fact of the matter about X. As I read it, the disagreement literature to date does not weigh the epistemic import of a successful abductive inference to skepticism.
They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic…while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, a kind of "inspiration"-most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract-that they defend with reasons sought after the fact. They are all advocates who don"t want to be called by that name, and for the most part even wily spokesman for their prejudices which they baptize "truths." (BGE 5) Later in the same book, Nietzsche notes that moral philosophers "make one laugh" with their idea of "morality as science," their pursuit of "a rational foundation for morality," which "seen clearly in the light of day" is really only a "scholarly form of good faith in the dominant morality, a new way of expressing it." Pointing at Schopenhauer"s attempt to supply a rational foundation for morality, Nietzsche says "we can draw our conclusions as to how scientific a "science" could be when its ultimate masters still talk like children" (BGE 186). The real significance of the claims of moral philosophers is "what they tell us about those who make them" for they are "a sign-language of the affects" (BGE 187), betraying things about the psychological needs and condition of those who make them.
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How do these considerations, elliptical as some of them are, support a skeptical conclusion about the objective existence of moral facts or properties? Recall the passage with which we began: Nietzsche claims that the key insight of the Sophists into morality was that "every morality [Moral] can be dialectically justified; i.e., they divine that all attempts to give reasons for morality [Moral] are necessarily sophistical-a proposition later proved on the grand scale by the ancient philosophers, from Plato onwards (down to Kant)" (WP 428). The Sophists, on this account, advance two related claims: (1) that "every morality can be dialectically justified" and; (2) that "all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophistical," where "sophistical" is obviously meant to have the pejorative connotation that the apparent dialectical justification does not, in fact, secure the truth of the moral propositions so justified. The purported dialectical justification can fail in this way if either it is not a valid argument or some of the premises are false.
11 But, then, what is the force of the claim that "every morality can be dialectically justified"? It must obviously be that every morality can have the appearance of being dialectically justified, either because its logical invalidity is not apparent or, more likely in this instance, because its premises, while apparently acceptable, are not true.
Yet Nietzsche goes further when he asserts that the second claim-namely, that "all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophistical"-is established attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophistical"? Nietzsche"s thought must be that all these philosophers appear to provide "dialectical justifications" for moral
propositions, but that all these justifications actually fail. But that still does not answer the question of how the fact of there being all these different moral philosophies proves that they are sophistical, i.e., that they do not, in fact, justify certain fundamental moral propositions?
The best explanation argument sketched earlier would supply Nietzsche an answer. The existence of incompatible moral philosophies providing dialectical justifications for moral propositions is best explained by the facts that (1) there are no objective facts about fundamental moral propositions, such that (2) it is possible to construct apparent dialectical justifications for moral propositions, even though (3) the best explanation for these theories is not that their dialectical justifications are sound but that they answer to the psychological needs of philosophers. The reason it is possible to construct "apparent" dialectical justification for differing moral propositions is because,
given the diversity of psychological needs of persons (including philosophers), it is always possible to find people for whom the premises of these dialectical justifications are acceptable.
The alternative, "moral realist" explanation for the data-namely, incompatible philosophical theories about morality-is both less simple and less consilient. 
IV. Objections to the Skeptical Argument from Moral Disagreement
Moral realists-who, for purposes here, will just mean those who deny skepticism about moral facts-have developed a variety of "defusing explanations" (Doris & Plakias 2008 : 311, 320-321; cf. Loeb 1998 for a useful survey and rebuttal of various strategies)
to block the abductive inference from apparently intractable moral disagreement to skepticism about moral facts. Moral disagreement is, after all, an epistemic phenomenon, from which we propose to draw a metaphysical conclusion. The "defusing" explanations of moral disagreement propose to exploit that fact, by suggesting alternate epistemic explanations for the disagreement. We may summarize the "defusing" objections to the skeptical argument as follows: (1) moral disagreements about concrete cases are not really intractable, they merely reflect factual disagreements or ignorance, and thus belie agreement on basic moral principles; (2) moral disagreements are about basic moral principles, but they are not really intractable, they are resolvable in principle; (3) real and intractable moral disagreements about foundational moral principles are best explained by cognitive defects or the fact that they occur under conditions that are not epistemically ideal: e.g., conditions of informational ignorance, irrationality or partiality; and (4) real and intractable moral disagreements about foundational moral principles are best explained in terms of differences in "background theory." Let us consider these in turn. competitors. There is, in short, no sign-I can think of none-that we are heading towards any epistemic rapprochement between these competing moral traditions. So why exactly are we supposed to be optimistic? The next argument purports to offer a reason.
Moral disagreements about concrete cases are not really intractable, they merely reflect factual disagreements or ignorance, and thus

Real and intractable moral disagreements about foundational moral principles
are best explained by cognitive defects or the fact that they occur under conditions that are not epistemically ideal: e.g., conditions of informational ignorance, irrationality or partiality. This is, again, a familiar move in the metaethical literature responding to the argument from moral disagreement, but one must appreciate how strange it is in response to the Nietzschean argument appealing to disagreement among moral philosophers across millennia. Are we really to believe that hyper-rational and reflective moral philosophers, whose lives, in most cases, are devoted to systematic reflection on philosophical questions, many of whom (historically) were independently wealthy (or indifferent to material success) and so immune to crass considerations of livelihood and material selfinterest, and most of whom, in the modern era, spend professional careers refining their positions, and have been doing so as a professional class in university settings for well over a century-are we really supposed to believe that they have reached no substantial agreement on any foundational moral principle because of ignorance, irrationality, or partiality?
Ignorance seems especially easy to dismiss as a relevant consideration. As Don 
are best explained in terms of differences in "background theory." This "defusing explanation" was developed originally against arguments from moral disagreement appealing to very particular moral judgments. Against the familiar fact that people"s moral intuitions about particular problems are often quite different, it is easy to reply, as
Loeb puts it, that since "all observation is theory laden…theoretical considerations will play a role in moral observations, just as they do in any others," and thus "differences of belief among moral reasoners should be expected because the same information will be observed differently depending on what background theories are present" (1998: 288).
The skeptical argument from moral disagreement among systematic moral philosophies, as Loeb himself discusses, presents two discreet challenges to this defusing explanation.
First, it is quite possible for Kantians and utilitarians to agree about the right action in particular cases, while disagreeing about the reasons the action is right, reflecting their disagreement about fundamental moral propositions. In these cases, the disagreement we are trying to explain is precisely the disagreement in the "background theory," and it is the surprising resilience of such disagreements, so the skeptic argues, that calls out for skepticism about moral facts. Second, where the disagreement about particular cases stems from differing background theories that hardly defuses an argument from skepticism appealing to intractable differences about background theories. As Doris and
Plakias remark, in considering a more extreme case: "if our disagreement with the Nazis about the merits of genocide is a function of a disagreement about the plausibility of constructing our world in terms of pan-Aryan destiny, does it look more superficial for that?" (2008: 321). Of course, in the Nazi case, we might think the Nazi background theory vulnerable on other grounds (e.g., of factual error or partiality), but, as we have already noted, it is not at all obvious how a disagreement informed by differing moral theories-say, Kantian and utilitarian-is in any way defused by noting that the disputants disagree not only about the particular case, but about the foundational moral propositions which bear on the evaluation of the case.
V. Has the Argument Proved Too much?
I want to conclude the objections to the skeptical argument from disagreement by considering three final worries: one interpretive--about saddling Nietzsche with the kind of moral skepticism at issue here-and two philosophical, pertaining to whether the argument sketched above has proved too much and, relatedly, whether it is selfreferentially defeating.
On the interpretive question, it seems to me that nothing has misled readers more often about Nietzsche"s metaethical view than the volume of his rhetoric: he writes as if (so the argument goes) there really is a fact of the matter about his judgments about the value of human greatness and the disvalue of Christianity and the herd and the rabble. In fact, however, Nietzsche"s notorious rhetorical excessses make, I think, at least as much (perhaps even more) sense on the anti-realist picture. For if Nietzsche is a moral antirealist committed to the polemical project of disabusing certain readers of their "false consciousness" about morality-their false belief that it is good for them-then he has every reason to use all available rhetorical devices-both rational and non-rational--to achieve that end. Indeed, recognizing that ours is a world without any objective moral truths, Nietzsche has a special reason to write most of the time as if his own (subjective) judgments of value were something other than matters of evaluative taste: for if they can claim a kind of epistemic and practical authority to which they aren"t really entitled, then they are more likely to influence belief and action, at least among readers who view truth as practically important (as Nietzsche supposes his readers will). Yet Nietzsche himself sometimes does admit the "terrible truth" about the subjective character of his evaluative judgments-as when he says that, "What is now decisive against Christianity is our taste Since, for Nietzsche, the "morality" at which the philosopher aims is to be explained in terms of his psychological needs and drives, and since these differ among philosophers, it will be unsurprising that there are a diversity of moral views, and philosophical systems purportedly justifying them-and it will be equally unsurprising that this same diversity, and intractability, spills over into metaphysical and epistemological systems, since they are just parasitic on the moral aims of the philosophers! Nietzsche, at least, then has good reason to bite the skeptical bullet about much philosophical disagreement.
Of course, we would need to think carefully about individual cases of philosophical disagreement, since not all of them, in all branches of philosophy, are as intractable or as foundational as they are in moral philosophy. Some philosophical disagreements can, in fact, be defused fairly easily. Thus, to take an example from one of my other fields, the debate in legal philosophy between natural law theorists and legal positivists about the nature of law has both an element of tractability (natural law theorists like Finnis have, in fact, conceded most of the claims that actually matter to legal positivism as a theory of law 13 ) and admits, in the intractable parts, of defusing by reference to the transparent and dogmatic religious commitments of the natural law theorists on the remaining issues they refuse to cede. In sum, the skeptical argument from disagreement among philosophers may have implications beyond moral philosophy, but what precisely they are will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
That still leaves a slightly different version of the worry that the argument "proves too much." For surely most philosophers will not conclude from the fact of disagreement among moral philosophers about the fundamental criteria of moral 13 See, e.g., Leiter (2007) Again, however, we need to be careful about the data points and the abductive inferences they warrant. The question is always what is the best explanation for the disagreement in question, given its character and scope. The "meta-disagreement"-about whether disagreement in foundational moral theory really warrants skepticism about moral facts-is, itself, of extremely recent vintage, barely discussed in the literature. Even if this paper and the challenge in Loeb (1998), for example, succeed in making the issue a topic of debate, and even if, after some critical discussion, the metadisagreement continues to persist, that still would not support the meta-skeptical conclusion that there is no fact of the matter about whether or not disagreement in foundational moral theory supports skepticism about moral facts. For before we are entitled to that conclusion, we would have to ask what the best explanation for the metadisagreement really is? Surely one possibility-dare I say the most likely possibility?-is that those who are professionally invested in normative moral theory as a serious, cognitive discipline-rather than seeing it, as Marxists or Nietzscheans might, as a series of elaborate post-hoc rationalizations for the emotional attachments and psychological needs of certain types of people (bourgeois academics, "slavish" types of psyches)-will resist, with any dialectical tricks at their disposal, the possibility that their entire livelihood is predicated on the existence of ethnographically bounded sociological and psychological artifacts. Nothing in the argument here establishes that conclusion, but nor is there any reason to think it would not be the correct one in the face of metadisagreement about the import of fundamental disagreement in moral philosophy.
Conclusion
If disagreement in science were as profound and rampant as it is in moral philosophy, we would expect proponents of "Intelligent Design" creationism to be lined up against evolutionary theorists in biology departments and defenders of teleological explanation to be doing battle with the believers in mechanical causation in physics. We would expect discourse in physics and mathematics and chemistry to be circumscribed by geographic and cultural boundaries, such that Japanese mathematicians and Chinese physicists were engaged in a largely separate world of intellectual discourse from their American and German counterparts, just like their colleagues in moral philosophy are.
But everyone outside philosophy, and at least some within it, knows that profound and intractable disagreement about foundational moral questions is the basic fact about the field. The fact of such disagreement-apparent to the Sophists in antiquity, and revived as an important skeptical consideration by Nietzsche in the 19 th -century-should be a live issue for us today. As philosophers, we should forget about "folk" disagreement, and instead confront the far more problematic phenomenon: namely, "expert" disagreement among those who devote their professional lives to systematic and rational reflection on moral questions, and who often share, notwithstanding this disagreement, lots of the same moral convictions about concrete cases, as well as often sharing similar lifestyles and cultural experiences. If Nietzsche is right, the best explanation for what we find is that, when it comes to moral theorizing, it really is a "swindle" to talk of truth in this field.
